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Abstract
How should a player who repeatedly plays a game against a no-regret learner
strategize to maximize his utility? We study this question and show that under
some mild assumptions, the player can always guarantee himself a utility of at
least what he would get in a Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. When the no-
regret learner has only two actions, we show that the player cannot get any higher
utility than the Stackelberg equilibrium utility. But when the no-regret learner has
more than two actions and plays a mean-based no-regret strategy, we show that the
player can get strictly higher than the Stackelberg equilibrium utility. We provide
a characterization of the optimal game-play for the player against a mean-based
no-regret learner as a solution to a control problem. When the no-regret learner’s
strategy also guarantees him a no-swap regret, we show that the player cannot get
anything higher than a Stackelberg equilibrium utility.
1 Introduction
Consider a two player bimatrix game with a finite number of actions for each player repeated over T
rounds. When playing a repeated game, a widely adopted strategy is to employ a no-regret learning
algorithm: a strategy that guarantees the player that in hindsight no single action when played
throughout the game would have performed significantly better. Knowing that one of the players
(the learner) is playing a no-regret learning strategy, what is the optimal gameplay for the other
player (the optimizer)? This question is the focus of our work.
If this were a single-shot strategic game where learning is not relevant, a (pure or mixed strategy)
Nash equilibrium is a reasonable prediction of the game’s outcome. In the T rounds game with
learning, can the optimizer guarantee himself a per-round utility of at least what he could get in a
single-shot game? Is it possible to get significantly more utility than this? Does this utility depend
on the specific choice of learning algorithm of the learner? What gameplay the optimizer should
adopt to achieve maximal utility? None of these questions are straightforward, and indeed none of
these have unconditional answers.
Our results. Central to our results is the idea of the Stackelberg equilibrium of the underlying
game. The Stackelberg variant of our game is a single-shot two-stage game where the optimizer is
the first player and can publicly commit to a mixed strategy; the learner then best responds to this
strategy. The Stackelberg equilibrium is the resulting equilibrium of this game when both players
play optimally. Note that the optimizer’s utility in the Stackelberg equilibrium is always weakly
larger than his utility in any (pure or mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium, and is often strictly larger.
Let V be the utility of the optimizer in the Stackelberg equilibrium. With some mild assumptions
on the game, we show that the optimizer can always guarantee himself a utility of at least (V −
ε)T − o(T ) in T rounds, irrespective of the learning algorithm used by the learner as long as it
has the no-regret guarantee (see Theorem 4). This means that if one of the players is a learner the
other player can already profit over the Nash equilibrium regardless of the specifics of the learning
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algorithm employed or the structure of the game. Further, if any one of the following conditions is
true:
1. the game is a constant-sum game,
2. the learner’s no-regret algorithm has the stronger guarantee of no-swap regret (see Section 2),
3. the learner has only two possible actions in the game,
the optimizer cannot get a utility higher than V T + o(T ) (see Theorem 5, Theorem 6, Theorem 7).
If the learner employs a learning algorithm from a natural class of algorithms called mean-based
learning algorithms [Braverman et al., 2018] (see Section 2) that includes popular no-regret algo-
rithms like the Multiplicative Weights algorithm, the Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader algorithm, and
the EXP3 algorithm, we show that there exist games where the optimizer can guarantee himself a
utility V ′T − o(T ) for some V ′ > V (see Theorem 8). We note the contrast between the cases of
2 and 3 actions for the learner: in the 2-actions case even if the learner plays a mean-based strategy,
the optimizer cannot get anything more than V T + o(T ) (Theorem 7), whereas with 3 actions, there
are games where he is able to guarantee a linearly higher utility.
Given this possibility of exceeding Stackelberg utility, our final result is on the nature and structure of
the utility optimal gameplay for the optimizer against a learner that employs a mean-based strategy.
First, we give a crisp characterization of the optimizer’s asymptotic optimal algorithm as the solution
to a control problem (see Section 4.2) in N dimensions where N is the number of actions for the
learner. This characterization is predicated on the fact that just knowing the cumulative historical
utilities of each of the learner’s actions is essentially enough information to accurately predict the
learner’s next action in the case of a mean-based learner. These N cumulative utilites thus form an
N -dimensional “state” for the learner which the optimizer can manipulate via their choice of action.
We then proceed to make multiple observations that simplify the solution space for this control
problem. We leave as a very interesting open question of computing or characterizing the optimal
solution to this control problem and we further provide one conjecture of a potential characterization.
Comparison to prior work. The very recent work of Braverman et al. [2018] is the closest to
ours. They study the specific 2-player game of an auction between a single seller and single buyer.
The main difference from Braverman et al. [2018] is that they consider a Bayesian setting where the
buyer’s type is drawn from a distribution, whereas there is no Bayesian element in our setting. But
beyond that the seller’s choice of the auction represents his action, and the buyer’s bid represents her
action. They show that regardless of the specific algorithm used by the buyer, as long as the buyer
plays a no-regret learning algorithm the seller can always earn at least the optimal revenue in a single
shot auction. Our Theorem 4 is a direct generalization of this result to arbitrary games without any
structure. Further Braverman et al. [2018] show that there exist no-regret strategies for the buyer
that guarantee that the seller cannot get anything better than the single-shot optimal revenue. Our
Theorems 5, 6 and 7 are both generalizations and refinements of this result, as they pinpoint both the
exact learner’s strategies and the kind of games that prevent the optimizer from going beyond the
Stackelberg utility. Braverman et al. [2018] show that when the buyer plays a mean-based strategy,
the seller can design an auction to guarantee him a revenue beyond the per round auction revenue.
Our control problem can be seen as a rough parallel and generalization of this result.
Other related work. The first notion of regret (without the swap qualification) we use
in the paper is also referred to as external-regret (see Hannan [1957], Foster and Vohra
[1993], Littlestone and Warmuth [1994], Freund and Schapire [1997], Freund and Schapire
[1999], Cesa-Bianchi et al. [1997]). The other notion of regret we use is swap regret. There is a
slightly weaker notion of regret called internal regret that was defined earlier in Foster and Vohra
[1998], which allows all occurrences of a given action x to be replaced by another action y.
Many no-internal-regret algorithms have been designed (see for example Hart and Mas-Colell
[2000], Foster and Vohra [1997, 1998, 1999], Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2003]). The stronger
notion of swap regret was introduced in Blum and Mansour [2005], and it allows one to simul-
taneously swap several pairs of actions. Blum and Mansour show how to efficiently convert a
no-regret algorithm to a no-swap-regret algorithm. One of the reasons behind the importance of
internal and swap regret is their close connection to the central notion of correlated equilibrium
introduced by Aumann [1974]. In a general n players game, a distribution over action profiles of
all the players is a correlated equilibrium if every player has zero internal regret. When all players
use algorithms with no-internal-regret guarantees, the time averaged strategies of the players
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converges to a correlated equilibrium (see Hart and Mas-Colell [2000]). When all players simply
use algorithms with no-external-regret guarantees, the time averaged strategies of the players
converges to the weaker notion of coarse correlated equilibrium. When the game is a zero-sum
game, the time-averaged strategies of players employing no-external-regret dynamics converges to
the Nash equilbrium of the game.
On the topic of optimizing against a no-regret-learner, Agrawal et al. [2018] study a setting similar
to Braverman et al. [2018] but also consider other types of buyer behavior apart from learning, and
show to how to robustly optimize against various buyer strategies in an auction.
2 Model and Preliminaries
2.1 Games and equilibria
Throughout this paper, we restrict our attention to simultaneous two-player bimatrix games G. We
refer to the first player as the optimizer and the second player as the learner. We denote the set
of actions available to the optimizer as A = {a1, a2, . . . , aM} and the set of actions available to
the learner as B = {b1, b2, . . . , bN}. If the optimizer chooses action ai and the learner chooses
action bj , then the optimizer receives utility uO(ai, bj) and the learner receives utility uL(ai, bj).
We normalize the utility such that |uO(ai, bj)| ≤ 1 and |uL(ai, bj)| ≤ 1. We write ∆(A) and
∆(B) to denote the set of mixed strategies for the optimizer and learner respectively. When the
optimizer plays α ∈ ∆(A) and the learner plays β ∈ ∆(B), the optimizer’s utility is denoted by
uO(α, β) =
∑M
i=1
∑N
j=1 αiβjuO(ai, bj), similarly for the learner’s utility.
We say that a strategy b ∈ B is a best-response to a strategy α ∈ ∆(A) if b ∈ argmaxb′∈B uL(α, b′).
We are now ready to define Stackelberg equilibrium [Von Stackelberg, 2010].
Definition 1. The Stackelberg equilibrium of a game is a pair of strategiesα ∈ ∆(A) and b ∈ B that
maximizes uO(α, b) under the constraint that b is a best-response to α. We call the value uO(α, b)
the Stackelberg value of the game.
A game is zero-sum if uO(ai, bj) + uL(ai, bj) = 0 for all i ∈ [M ] and j ∈ [N ]; likewise, a
game is constant-sum if uO(ai, bj) + uL(ai, bj) = C for some fixed constant C for all i ∈ [M ]
and j ∈ [N ]. Note that for zero-sum or constant-sum games, the Stackelberg equilibrium coincides
with the standard notion of Nash equilibrium due to the celebrated minimax theorem [von Neumann,
1928]. Moreover, throughout this paper, we assume that the learner does not have weakly dominated
strategies: a strategy b ∈ B is weakly dominated if there exists β ∈ ∆(B \ {b}) such that for all
a ∈ A, uL(a, β) ≥ uL(a, b).
We are interested in the setting where the optimizer and the learner repeatedly play the game G for
T rounds. We will denote the optimizer’s action at time t as at; likewise we will denote the learner’s
action at time t as bt. Both the optimizer and learner’s utilities are additive over rounds with no
discounting.
The optimizer’s strategy can be adaptive (i.e. at can depend on the previous values of bt) or non-
adaptive (in which case it can be expressed as a sequence of mixed strategies (α1, α2, . . . , αT )).
Unless otherwise specified, all positive results (results guaranteeing the optimizer can guarantee
some utility) apply for non-adaptive optimizers and all negative results apply even to adaptive opti-
mizers. As the name suggests, the learner’s (adaptive) strategy will be specified by some variant of
a low-regret learning algorithm, as described in the next section.
2.2 No-regret learning and mean-based learning
In the classic multi-armed bandit problem with T rounds, the learner selects one ofK options (a.k.a.
arms) on round t and receives a reward ri,t ∈ [0, 1] if he selects option i. The rewards can be chosen
adversarially and the learner’s objective is to maximize her total reward.
Let it be the arm pulled by the learner at round t. The regret for a (possibly randomized) learning
algorithm A is defined as the difference between performance of the algorithm A and the best arm:
Reg(A) = maxi
∑T
t=1 ri,t − rit,t. An algorithmA for the multi-armed bandit problem is no-regret
if the expected regret is sub-linear in T , i.e., E[Reg(A)] = o(T ). In addition to the bandits setting
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in which the learner only learns the reward of the arm he pulls, our results also apply to the experts
setting in which the learner can learn the rewards of all arms for every round. Simple no-regret
strategies exist in both the bandits and the experts settings.
Among no-regret algorithms, we are interested in two special classes of algorithms. The first is the
class of mean-based strategies:
Definition 2 (Mean-based Algorithm). Let σi,t =
∑t
s=1 ri,s be the cumulative reward for pulling
arm i for the first t rounds. An algorithm is γ-mean-based if whenever σi,t < σj,t − γT , the
probability for the algorithm to pull arm i on round t is at most γ. An algorithm is mean-based if it
is γ-mean-based for some γ = o(1).
Intuitively, mean-based strategies are strategies that play the arm that historically performs the best.
Braverman et al. [2018] shows that many no-regret algorithms are mean-based, including commonly
used variants of EXP3 (for the bandits setting), the MultiplicativeWeights algorithm (for the experts
setting) and the Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader algorithm (for the experts setting).
The second class is the class of no-swap-regret algorithms:
Definition 3 (No-Swap-Regret Algorithm). The swap regret Regswap(A) of an algorithm A is de-
fined as
Regswap(A) = max
π:[K]→[K]
Reg(A, π) =
T∑
t=1
rπ(it),t − rit,t
where the maximum is over all functions π mapping options to options. An algorithm is no-swap-
regret if the expected swap regret is sublinear in T , i.e. E[Regswap(A)] = o(T ).
Intuitively, no-swap-regret strategies strengthen the no-regret criterion in the following way: no-
regret guarantees the learning algorithm performs as well as the best possible arm overall, but no-
swap-regret guarantees the learning algorithm performs as well as the best possible arm over each
subset of rounds where the same action is played. Given a no-regret algorithm, a no-swap-regret
algorithm can be constructed via a clever reduction (see Blum and Mansour [2005]).
3 Playing against no-regret learners
3.1 Achieving Stackelberg equilibrium utility
To begin with, we show that the optimizer can achieve an average utility per round arbitrarily close
to the Stackelberg value against a no-regret learner.
Theorem 4. Let V be the Stackelberg value of the game G. If the learner is playing a no-regret
learning algorithm, then for any ε > 0, the optimizer can guarantee at least (V −ε)T −o(T ) utility.
Proof. Let (α, b) be the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game G. Since (α, b) forms a Stackelberg
equilibrium, b ∈ argmaxb′ uL(α, b′). Moreover, by the assumption that the learner does not have a
weakly dominated strategy, there does not exist β ∈ ∆(B \ {b}) such that for all a ∈ A, uL(a, β) ≥
uL(a, b). By Farkas’s lemma [Farkas, 1902], there must exist an α
′ ∈ ∆(A) such that for all
b′ ∈ B \ {b}, uL(α′, b) ≥ uL(α′, b′) + κ for κ > 0.
Therefore, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), the optimizer can play the strategy α∗ = (1 − δ)α + δα′ such that
b is the unique best response to α∗ and playing strategy b′ 6= b will induce a utility loss at least δκ
for the learner. As a result, since the leaner is playing a no-regret learning algorithm, in expectation,
there is at most o(T ) rounds in which the learner plays b′ 6= b. It follows that the optimizer’s
utility is at least V T − δ(V − uO(α′, b))T − o(T ). Thus, we can conclude our proof by setting
ε = δ(V − uO(α′, b)).
Next, we show that in the special class of constant-sum games, the Stackelberg value is the best that
the optimizer can hope for when playing against a no-regret learner.
Theorem 5. Let G be a constant-sum game, and let V be the Stackelberg value of this game. If
the learner is playing a no-regret algorithm, then the optimizer receives no more than V T + o(T )
utility.
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Proof. Let ~a = (a1, · · · , aT ) be the sequence of the optimizer’s actions. Moreover, let α∗ ∈ ∆(A)
be a mixed strategy such that α∗ plays ai ∈ A with probability α∗i = |{t | at = ai}|/T .
Since the learner is playing a no-regret learning algorithm, the learner’s cumulative utility is at least
maxb′∈B uL(a∗, b′)T −o(T ) = CT − (minb′∈B uO(a∗, b′)T + o(T )), whereC is the constant sum,
which implies that the optimizer’s utility is at most
max
a∗∈∆(A)
min
b′∈B
uO(a
∗, b′)T + o(T ) = V T + o(T )
where the equality follows that the Stackelberg value is equal to the minimax value by the minimax
theorem for a constant-sum game.
3.2 No-swap-regret learning
In this section, we show that if the learner is playing a no-swap-regret algorithm, the optimizer can
only achieve their Stackelberg utility per round.
Theorem 6. Let V be the Stackelberg value of the gameG. If the learner is playing a no-swap-regret
algorithm, then the optimizer will receive no more than V T + o(T ) utility.
Proof. Let ~a = (a1, · · · , aT ) be the sequence of the optimizer’s actions and let~b = (b1, · · · , bT ) be
the realization of the sequence of the learner’s actions. Moreover, let Pr[~b] be the probability that
the learner (who is playing some no-swap-regret learning algorithm) plays~b given that the adversary
plays ~a. Then, the marginal probability for the learner to play bj ∈ B at round t is
Pr[bt = bj] =
∑
~b:bt=bj
Pr[~b].
Let αbj ∈ ∆(A) be a mixed strategy such that αbj plays ai ∈ A with probability
α
bj
i =
∑
t:at=ai
Pr[bt = bj]∑
t Pr[b
t = bj ]
.
Let B¯ = {bj ∈ B : bj 6∈ argmaxb′ uL(αbj , b′)} and consider a mapping π such that π(bj) ∈
argmaxb′ uL(α
bj , b′). Then, the swap-regret under π is
∑
bj∈B
((
uL(α
bj , π(bj))− uL(αbj , bj)
) ·∑
t
Pr[bt = bj]
)
=
∑
bj∈B¯
((
uL(α
bj , π(bj))− uL(αbj , bj)
) ·∑
t
Pr[bt = bj]
)
≥ δ ·
∑
bj∈B¯
(∑
t
Pr[bt = bj ]
)
where δ = minbj∈B¯
(
uL(α
bj , π(bj)) − uL(αbj , bj). Therefore, since the learner is playing a no-
swap-regret algorithm, we have
∑
bj∈B¯ (
∑
t Pr[b
t = bj ]) = o(T ).
Moreover, for bj ∈ B \ B¯, the optimizer’s utility when the learner plays bj is at most
uO(α
bj , bj) ·
∑
t
Pr[bt = bj ] ≤ V ·
∑
t
Pr[bt = bj].
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Thus, the optimizer’s utility is at most
∑
bj∈B
(
uO(α
bj , bj) ·
∑
t
Pr[bt = bj]
)
=
∑
bj∈B\B¯
(
uO(α
bj , bj) ·
∑
t
Pr[bt = bj]
)
+
∑
bj∈B¯
(
uO(α
bj , bj) ·
∑
t
Pr[bt = bj]
)
≤ V ·
∑
bj∈B\B¯
(∑
t
Pr[bt = bj ]
)
+ 1 ·
∑
bj∈B¯
(∑
t
Pr[bt = bj ]
)
≤ V T + o(T ).
Theorem 7. Let G be a game where the learner has N = 2 actions, and let V be the Stackelberg
value of this game. If the learner is playing a no-regret algorithm, then the optimizer receives no
more than V T + o(T ) utility.
Proof. By Theorem 6, it suffices to show that when there are two actions for the learner, a no-regret
learning algorithm is in fact a no-swap-regret learning algorithm.
When there are only two actions, there are three possible mappings from B → B other than the
identity mapping. Let π1 be a mapping such that π1(b1) = b1 and π
1(b2) = b1, π
2 be a mapping
such that π2(b1) = b2 and π
2(b2) = b2, and π
3 be a mapping such that π3(b1) = b2 and π
3(b2) =
b1.
Since the learner is playing a no-regret learning algorithm, we have E[Reg(A, π1)] = o(T ) and
E[Reg(A, π2)] = o(T ). Moreover, notice that
E[Reg(A, π3)] = E[Reg(A, π1)] + E[Reg(A, π2)] = o(T ),
which concludes the proof.
4 Playing against mean-based learners
From the results of the previous section, it is natural to conjecture that no optimizer can achievemore
than the Stackelberg value per round if playing against a no-regret algorithm. After all, this is true for
the subclass of no-swap-regret algorithms (Theorem 6) and is true for simple games: constant-sum
games (Theorems 5) and games in which the learner only has two actions (Theorem 7).
In this section we show that this is not the case. Specifically, we show that there exist gamesGwhere
an optimizer can win strictly more than the Stackelberg value every round when playing against a
mean-based learner. We emphasize that the same strategy for the optimizer will work against any
mean-based learning algorithm the learner uses.
We then proceed to characterize the optimal strategy for a non-adaptive optimizer playing against
a mean-based learner as the solution to an optimal control problem in N dimensions (where N is
the number of actions of the learner), and make several preliminary observations about structure an
optimal solution to this control problem must possess. Understanding how to efficiently solve this
control problem (or whether the optimal solution is even computable) is an intriguing open question.
4.1 Beating the Stackelberg value
We begin by showing it is possible for the optimizer to get significantly (linear in T ) more utility
when playing against a mean-based learner.
Theorem 8. There exists a gameG with Stackelberg value V where the optimizer can receive utility
at least V ′T − o(T ) against a mean-based learner for some V ′ > V .
Proof. Assume that the learner is using a γ-mean-based algorithm. Consider the bimatrix game
shown in Table 1 in which the optimizer is the row player (These utilities are bounded in [−2, 2]
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instead of [−1, 1] for convenience; we can divide through by 2 to get a similar example where utility
is bounded in [−1, 1]). We first argue that the Stackelberg value of this game is 0. Notice that
if the optimizer plays Bottom with probability more than 0.5, then the learner’s best response is
to play Mid, resulting in a −2 utility for the optimizer . However, if the optimizer plays Bottom
with probability at most 0.5, the expected utility for the optimizer from each column is at most 0.
Therefore, in the Stackelberg equilibrium, the optimizer will play Top and Bottom with probability
0.5 each, and the learner will best respond with purely playing Right.
Left Mid Right
Top (0,
√
γ) (-2, -1) (-2, 0)
Bottom (0, -1) (-2, 1) (2, 0)
Table 1: Example game for beating the Stackelberg value.
However, the optimizer can obtain utility T − o(T ) by playing Top for the first 12T rounds and
then playing Bottom for the remaining 12T rounds. Given the optimizer’s strategy, for the first
1
2T
rounds, the learner will play Left with probability at least (1 − 2γ) after first √γT rounds. For the
remaining 12T rounds, the learner will switch to play Right with probability at least (1−2γ) between
(
1+
√
γ
2 +γ)T -th round and (1−γ)T -th round, since the cumulative utility for playing Left is at most
1
2T ·
√
γ −
√
γ
2 T − γT = −γT and the cumulative utility for playing Mid is at most −γT .
Therefore, the cumulative utility for the optimizer for the first 12T rounds is at least
(1− 2γ)(1
2
−√γ)T · 0 +
(
1
2
T − (1− 2γ)(1
2
−√γ)T
)
· (−2) = −o(T ),
and the cumulative utility for the optimizer for the remaining 12T rounds is at least
(1− 2γ)(1
2
−
√
γ
2
− 2γ)T · 2 +
(
1
2
T − (1− 2γ)(1
2
−
√
γ
2
− 2γ)T
)
· (−2) = T − o(T ).
Thus, the optimizer can obtain a total utility T − o(T ), which is greater than V T = 0 for the
Stackelberg value V = 0 in this game.
4.2 The geometry of mean-based learning
We have just seen that it is possible for the optimizer to get more than the Stackelberg value when
playing against a mean-based learner. This raises an obvious next question: how much utility can
an optimizer obtain when playing against a mean-based learner? What is the largest α such that an
optimizer can always obtain utility αT − o(T ) against a mean-based learner?
In this section, we will see how to reduce the problem of constructing the optimal gameplay of a
non-adaptive optimizer to solving a control problem in N dimensions. The primary insight is that a
mean-based learner’s behavior depends only on their historical cumulative utilities for each of their
N actions, and therefore we can characterize the essential “state” of the learner by a tuple ofN real
numbers that represent the cumulative utilities for different actions. The optimizer can control the
state of the learner by playing different actions, and in different regions of the state space the learner
plays specific responses.
More formally, our control problem will involve constructing a path in RN starting at the origin. For
each i ∈ [N ], let Si equals the subset of (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ RN where ui = max(u1, u2, . . . , uN)
(this will represent the subset of state space where the learner will play action bi). Note that these
sets Si (up to some intersection of measure 0) partition the entire space R
N .
We represent the optimizer’s strategy π as a sequence of tuples (α1, t1), (α2, t2), . . . , (αk, tk) with
αi ∈ ∆(A) and ti ∈ [0, 1] satisfying
∑
i ti = 1. Here the tuple (αi, ti) represents the optimizer
playingmixed strategyαi for a ti fraction of the total rounds. This strategy evolves the learner’s state
as follows. The learner originally starts at the state P0 = 0. After the ith tuple (αi, ti), the learner’s
state evolves according to Pi = Pi−1+ ti(uL(αi, b1), uL(αi, b2), . . . , uL(αi, bN )) (in fact, the state
linearly interpolates between Pi−1 and Pi as the optimizer plays this action). For simplicity, we will
assume that positive combinations of vectors of the form (uL(αi, b1), uL(αi, b2), . . . , uL(αi, bN))
can generate the entire state space RN .
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To characterize the optimizer’s reward, we must know which set Si the learner’s state belongs to.
For this reason, we will insist that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, there exists a ji such that both Pi−1 and
Pi belong to the same region Sji . It is possible to convert any strategy π into a strategy of this
form by subdividing a step (α, t) that crosses a region boundary into two steps (α, t′) and (α, t′′)
with t = t′ + t′′ so that the first step stops exactly at the region boundary. If there is more than
one possible choice for ji (i.e. Pi−1 and Pi lie on the same region boundary), then without loss
of generality we let the optimizer choose ji, since the optimizer can always modify the initial path
slightly so that Pi and Pi−1 both lie in a unique region.
Once we have done this, the optimizer’s average utility per round is given by the expression:
U(π) =
k∑
i=1
tiuO(αi, bji).
Theorem 9. Let U∗ = supπ U(π) where the supremum is over all valid strategies π in this control
game. Then
1. For any ε > 0, there exists a non-adaptive strategy for the optimizer which guarantees
expected utility at least (U∗ − ε)T − o(T ) when playing against any mean-based learner.
2. For any ε > 0, there exists no non-adaptive strategy for the optimizer which can guarantee
expected utility at least (U∗ + ε)T + o(T ) when playing against any mean-based learner.
Understanding how to solve this control problem (even inefficiently, in finite time) is an interesting
open problem. In the remainder of this section, we make some general observations which will let
us cut down the strategy space of the optimizer even further and propose a conjecture to the form of
the optimal strategy.
The first observation is that when the learner has N actions, our state space is truly N − 1 dimen-
sional, notN dimensional. This is because in addition to the learner’s actions only depending on the
cumulative reward for each action, they in fact only depend on the differences between cumulative
rewards for different actions (see Definition 2). This means we can represent the state of the learner
as a vector (x1, x2, . . . , xN−1) ∈ RN−1, where xi = ui − uN . The sets Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 can
be written in terms of the xi as
Si = {x|xi = max(x1, . . . , xN−1, 0)}
and
SN = {x|0 = max(x1, . . . , xN−1, 0)}.
The next observation is that if the optimizer makes several consecutive steps in the same region Si,
we can combine them into a single step. Specifically, assume Pi, Pi+1, and Pi+2 all belong to some
region Sj , where (αi, ti) sends Pi to Pi+1 and (αi+1, ti+1) sends Pi+1 to Pi+2. Then replacing
these two steps with
(
αiti+αi+1ti+1
ti+ti+1
, ti + ti+1
)
results in a strategy with the exact same reward
U(π). Applying this fact whenever possible, this means we can restrict our attention to strategies
where all Pi (with the possible exception of the final state Pk) lie on the boundary of two or more
regions Si.
Finally, we observe that this control problem is scale-invariant; if
π = ((α1, t1), (α2, t2), . . . , (αn, tn))
is a valid policy that obtains utility U , then
λπ = ((α1, λt1), (α2, λt2), . . . , (αn, λtn))
is another valid policy (with the exception that
∑
ti = λ, not 1) which obtains utility λU (this is
true since all the regions Si are cones with apex at the origin). This means we do not have to restrict
to policies with
∑
ti = 1; we can choose a policy of any total time, as long as we normalize the
utility by
∑
ti. This generalizes the strategy space, but is useful for the following reason. Consider
a sequence of steps π which starts at some point P (not necessarily 0) and ends at P . Then if U is
the average utility of this cycle, then U∗ ≥ U (in particular, we can consider any policy which goes
from 0 to P and then repeats this cycle many times). Likewise, if we have a sequence of steps π
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which starts at some point P and ends at λP for some λ > 1 which achieves average utility U , then
again U∗ ≥ U (by considering the policy which proceeds 0 → P → λP → λ2P → . . . (note that
it is essential that λ ≥ 1 to prevent this from converging back to 0 in finite time).
These observations motivate the following conjecture.
Conjecture 10. The value U∗ is achieved by either:
1. The average utility of a policy starting at the origin and consisting of at most N steps (in
distinct regions).
2. The average utility of a path of at most N steps (in distinct regions) which starts at some
point P and returns to λP for some λ ≥ 1.
We leave it as an interesting open problem to compute the optimal solution to this control problem.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 9
Proof of Theorem 9. Part 1: Let π = ((α1, t1), (α2, t2), . . . , (αk, tk)) be a strategy for the control
problem which satisfies U(π) ≥ U∗ − 0.5ε. As suggested by π, we will consider the strategy of the
optimizer where for each i (in order), the optimizer plays mixed strategy αi for tiT rounds. We will
show that this strategy guarantees an expected utility of (U∗ − ε)T − o(T ) for the optimizer .
Since the learner is mean-based, they are playing a γ-mean-based algorithm for some γ = o(1).
As in Definition 2, let σj,t be the learner’s cumulative utility from playing action bj for rounds 1
through t. For 0 ≤ i ≤ k, let τi =
∑i
j=1 ti (with T0 = 0). For τ ∈ [0, 1], let P (τ) be the state of the
control problem at time τ (linearly interpolating between Pi and Pi+1 if τi ≤ τ ≤ τi+1); note that
P (τi) = Pi. We will first show that with high probability, |σj,τT −TP (τ)j| ≤ o(T ); in other words,
P (τ) provides a good approximation of the true cumulative utilities of the learner in the repeated
game.
To see this, we first claim |E[σj,τT ] − TP (τ)j | ≤ k. Fix any round t in [τiT, τi+1T ]; this means
that the optimizer plays strategy αi during round t, and therefore that E[σj,t+1 − σj,t] = uL(α, bj).
If t+ 1 also belongs to [τiT, τi+1T ] (so t/T and (t+ 1)/T both belong to [τi, τi+1]), we also have
that T (P ( t+1T )j − P ( tT )j) = uL(α, b1). Since there are only k intervals, t and t+ 1 belong to the
same interval for all but k rounds, and since utilities are bounded by 1 it follows that |E[σj,τT ] −
TP (τ)j | ≤ k. Now, we also claim that with high probability (at least 1− 1/T ), for all t, |E[σj,t]−
σj,t| ≤ 10
√
T log(TN). This follows simply from Hoeffding’s inequality, since each component
of σj,t is the sum of t independent random variables bounded in [−1, 1]. Together, this implies that
|E[σj,τT ]− TP (τ)j | ≤ o(T ).
We now claim that for sufficiently large T , the learner will play action ji for rounds t ∈ [τiT, τi+1T ].
To see this, recall that Sji is the unique region containing bothPi and Pi+1. Since regions are convex
with disjoint interiors, this means that the segment connecting Pi and Pi+1 lies in the interior of Sji .
By the definition of Sji , this implies that there exists some δ > 0 such that for at least 1 − 0.5ε
fraction of τ in the interval [τi, τi+1], P (τ) satisfies P (τ)ji − P (τ)j ≥ δ for all j 6= ji. Since
|E[σj,τT ]− TP (τ)j | ≤ o(T ) for all j, this means that for at least a 1− 0.5ε fraction of rounds t in
[τiT, τi+1T ], we have that σji,τT − σj,τT ≥ δT − o(T ). For sufficiently large T , this is bigger than
γT (which is also o(T )).
Therefore, for each i, for at least (1− 0.5)εtiT rounds, the optimizer plays the mixed strategy α and
the learner plays action bji . The optimizer’s total expected utility is therefore at least
k∑
i=1
(1− 0.5ε)tiTuO(αi, bji) = (1− 0.5ε)U(π)T ≥ (1− ε)U∗T.
Part 2:
Assume there exists such a family (one for each T ) of non-adaptive strategies (α1, α2, . . . , αT ) for
the optimizer . Since this strategy must work against any mean-based learner, we will construct a
bad mean-based learner for this strategy in the following way. Fix γ = T−1/2 (any γ > 2/T will
work). At any time t, let Jt = {bj|maxi σi,t−σj,t < γT } be the set of actions for the learner whose
historical performance are within γT of the optimally performing action. The mean-based property
requires the learner to play an action in Jt with probability at least 1−Kγ. Our mean-based learner
will choose the worst action in Jt for the optimizer ; that is, the action bj ∈ Jt which minimizes
uO(α
t, bj).
Now, choose a sufficiently large T0 such that this strategy achieves average utility at least (U
∗+0.5ε)
for the optimizer against this mean-based learner. We now claim we can construct a solution π to
the control problem with k = T0 which satisfies U(π) ≥ U∗ + 0.5ε, contradicting the optimality
of U∗. Consider the protocol π = ((α1, 1/T0), (α2, 1/T0), . . . , (αT0 , 1/T0)). This is not a proper
protocol, since some of the steps of this protocol might start in one region Sj and end in a different
region Sj′ , but for any such steps we can divide them into substeps per region as described earlier.
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We now claim that the step (αt, 1/T0) only passes through regions in the set Jt. To see this, note
that Pt and Pt+1 differ in each coordinate by at most 1/T0 (since all utilities are bounded by 1).
Therefore if the segment between Pt and Pt+1 passes through a point on the boundary Sj ∩ Sj′
(where uj = u
′
j = maxi ui), it must be the case that (Pt)j and (Pt)j′ are both within 2/T0 of
maxj(Pt)j . By construction (Pt)j =
1
T0
σj,t, so this implies that maxi σi,t − σj,t ≤ 2 ≤ γT , and
therefore j ∈ Jt (similarly, j′ ∈ Jt).
Now, if the step (αt, 1/T0) only passes through regions in the set Jt, it obtains utility for the opti-
mizer at least minbj∈Jt
1
T0
uO(α
t, bj), and thus
U(π) =
1
T0
∑
t
min
bj∈Jt
uO(α
t, bj).
But this sum is exactly the utility of the optimizer against our mean-based learner, which is at least
(U∗ + 0.5ε)T0. It follows that U(π) ≥ U∗ + 0.5ε, contradicting that U∗ is optimal.
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